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		<title>Toto: New encyclopedia article: Pareto Efficiency</title>
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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;New encyclopedia article: Pareto Efficiency&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;Pareto efficiency&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;, also called Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off. Named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, the concept is a central criterion in welfare economics for evaluating the efficiency of economic outcomes. An allocation that is not Pareto efficient is wasteful, because some improvement is possible without harming anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Definition ==&lt;br /&gt;
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An allocation is Pareto efficient if no feasible reallocation can make at least one person better off without making someone else worse off. A change that makes at least one person better off and no one worse off is called a Pareto improvement. The set of all Pareto-efficient allocations is called the Pareto frontier or contract curve, and different points along it represent different distributions of well-being.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pareto efficiency is a minimal criterion of efficiency. It says nothing about fairness or about the distribution of resources; an allocation in which one person owns everything and others own nothing can be Pareto efficient if any reallocation would make the owner worse off. Pareto efficiency is therefore necessary but not sufficient for a desirable outcome, and it must be combined with distributional judgements to evaluate social welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Fundamental theorems ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that a competitive equilibrium, under conditions of complete markets, perfect competition, and no externalities, is Pareto efficient. This theorem formalises the idea that competitive markets allocate resources efficiently, and it provides a benchmark for evaluating market outcomes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second fundamental theorem states that any Pareto-efficient allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with an appropriate redistribution of initial endowments, provided lump-sum transfers are feasible. This theorem separates efficiency from distribution: society can, in principle, achieve both efficiency and fairness by redistributing endowments and then letting markets operate. In practice, lump-sum transfers are rarely feasible, which complicates the separation.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Market failures and efficiency ==&lt;br /&gt;
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When the conditions for the fundamental theorems fail, competitive equilibria may not be Pareto efficient. Externalities, public goods, imperfect competition, information asymmetries, and incomplete markets can all cause inefficiency, creating scope for corrective policy. In such cases, a Pareto improvement may be possible through taxes, subsidies, regulation, or the provision of public goods.&lt;br /&gt;
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The concept is also used to assess the efficiency of policy interventions. A policy that makes some people better off without harming others is a Pareto improvement and, on efficiency grounds, desirable. Most real policies, however, create both winners and losers, so they are evaluated using broader criteria, such as potential Pareto improvement, under which the gains to winners exceed the losses to losers, allowing compensation in principle.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Limitations ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Pareto efficiency has important limitations. It provides no guidance on distributional questions and can be consistent with extreme inequality. It also focuses on individuals&amp;#039; own evaluations of their well-being, which may be affected by information problems, adaptation, and behavioural biases. Moreover, the Pareto criterion may be silent when a policy creates both winners and losers, as most policies do.&lt;br /&gt;
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Economists therefore use additional criteria, including social welfare functions, measures of inequality, and distributional weights, to evaluate outcomes. Despite its limitations, Pareto efficiency remains a foundational concept, providing a precise definition of waste and a benchmark against which market and policy outcomes can be assessed. It is central to welfare economics, to the analysis of market failure, and to the evaluation of policy trade-offs.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Pareto efficiency and fairness ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Pareto efficiency is silent on fairness. An allocation can be Pareto efficient and yet involve extreme inequality, since the criterion only concerns whether anyone can be made better off without harming others. This silence is a strength, in that it allows economists to identify waste without imposing value judgements about distribution, but also a limitation, since efficiency alone is an incomplete guide to policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The relationship between efficiency and equity is a central theme in welfare economics. The second fundamental theorem suggests that society can, in principle, achieve any desired distribution of welfare by redistributing endowments and then allowing competitive markets to operate. In practice, lump-sum redistribution is rarely feasible, and redistribution through taxes and transfers creates efficiency costs. Policymakers therefore face a trade-off, and the optimal balance depends on societal preferences and on the magnitude of the efficiency costs.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Pareto efficiency in practice ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In practice, Pareto improvements are rare, because most policy changes create both winners and losers. Analysts therefore use the concept of potential Pareto improvement, associated with the compensation principle, under which a change is desirable if the gains to winners exceed the losses to losers, so that winners could in principle compensate losers and still be better off. This criterion underlies cost-benefit analysis, which compares the monetised benefits and costs of a project or policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The compensation principle has its own limitations, since actual compensation is often not paid, and the distributional consequences of a change may be as important as its aggregate effect. Cost-benefit analysis therefore often includes distributional weights, giving greater weight to gains and losses for disadvantaged groups, to reflect societal preferences.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Extensions and critiques ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Pareto efficiency has been extended and critiqued in several directions. The concept of constrained Pareto efficiency acknowledges that some improvements may be infeasible because of information or institutional constraints, and it focuses on achievable improvements. Mechanism design theory studies how to design institutions that achieve desirable outcomes given private information and incentives, using Pareto and related criteria.&lt;br /&gt;
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Critiques of Pareto efficiency come from behavioural and philosophical perspectives. Behavioural economists note that individuals&amp;#039; preferences may be inconsistent, influenced by framing, or based on mistaken beliefs, which complicates the interpretation of efficiency. Philosophers question whether individual preferences, however defined, are the appropriate basis for evaluating social outcomes, and propose alternative criteria based on capabilities, rights, or needs. These debates enrich the understanding of welfare and inform the design of policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
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* [[Welfare Economics]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Market Failure]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[General Equilibrium]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social Welfare Function]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Pareto Improvement]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Welfare economics texts on Pareto efficiency.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Public economics literature on market failure and policy.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;OECD work on policy evaluation and welfare.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Journal literature on social choice and distribution.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Toto</name></author>
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