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	<title>Hyperinflation - Revision history</title>
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	<updated>2026-10-19T19:03:05Z</updated>
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		<title>Heioo: New encyclopedia article: Hyperinflation</title>
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		<updated>2026-10-06T05:15:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;New encyclopedia article: Hyperinflation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;Hyperinflation&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039; is an extremely rapid and persistent increase in the general price level, conventionally defined as inflation exceeding fifty per cent per month. At such rates, the value of money collapses, prices are revised constantly, and the public loses confidence in the domestic currency, switching to foreign currencies, to goods, or to other assets. Hyperinflation is rare but catastrophic, and it typically arises from the financing of large fiscal deficits by money creation and is ended by decisive fiscal and monetary reform.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Definition and measurement ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The most widely used definition, associated with the economist Phillip Cagan, is inflation of at least fifty per cent per month, sustained for several months. Some analysts use a lower threshold, such as one hundred per cent per year, to identify episodes of very high inflation that share many of the features of hyperinflation. During hyperinflation, prices may change daily or even hourly, and the purchasing power of money falls so quickly that holding it becomes costly.&lt;br /&gt;
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The measurement of prices becomes difficult because the basket of goods changes, because prices are quoted in multiple currencies, and because the interval between price observations is long relative to the rate of change. Statistical agencies may struggle to collect data, and the reported figures may lag and understate the true rate. The accelerating rate of inflation, in which the rate itself rises ever faster, is a hallmark of the phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Causes ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Hyperinflation is almost always associated with the financing of large and persistent fiscal deficits through the creation of money, a process called seigniorage. When a government cannot borrow or raise taxes sufficiently, it may turn to the central bank to finance its spending, expanding the money supply. As prices rise, the real value of the money issued falls, so the government must issue even more to finance the same real spending, generating an accelerating spiral.&lt;br /&gt;
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The spiral is reinforced by expectations and by the loss of confidence in the currency. As the public anticipates further inflation, it reduces its holdings of money and spends quickly, which raises velocity and causes prices to rise faster for a given money supply. The resulting increase in nominal spending raises prices further, and the process becomes self-reinforcing. The breakdown of the tax system, often due to war, political instability, or the collapse of the economy, is a common precondition.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Consequences ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The consequences of hyperinflation are severe. The functions of money break down: it becomes useless as a store of value, unreliable as a unit of account, and inconvenient as a medium of exchange. Barter and foreign currencies replace the domestic money, and the domestic currency may cease to circulate. Real wages and savings are destroyed, and fixed-income groups and creditors suffer, while debtors benefit from the erosion of the real value of their obligations.&lt;br /&gt;
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The economy suffers more broadly. Uncertainty discourages investment, long-term contracts become impossible, and firms devote resources to managing cash rather than to production. Trade may shift to informal and foreign-currency channels, reducing the tax base and worsening the fiscal position. Social and political unrest often accompanies hyperinflation, and the distributional effects can be severe and lasting, destroying confidence in institutions and in the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Ending hyperinflation ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Ending hyperinflation requires decisive measures. Fiscal reform must eliminate the deficit that drives money creation, through spending cuts, tax increases, or both, and the central bank must be barred from financing the government. A credible commitment to monetary discipline, often supported by institutional changes such as central bank independence or a currency board, is essential to restoring confidence. External support, such as a stabilisation loan, can provide the resources needed for the transition.&lt;br /&gt;
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Restoring confidence may also require a new currency or a currency reform, in which the old currency is replaced at a fixed ratio, and indexation or temporary price controls may be used to break the inflationary spiral. The key is credibility: the public must believe that the new regime will be maintained. Historical examples, including the stabilisations that ended the hyperinflations of the 1920s and more recent episodes, show that reform can succeed when it is comprehensive and backed by credible commitments, but that partial measures often fail.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Some historical episodes ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen several episodes of hyperinflation. The German hyperinflation of the early 1920s, with rates reaching into the millions of per cent per year, destroyed savings and contributed to political instability. The Hungarian episode after the Second World War was among the most severe ever recorded. More recent cases, including those in Latin America and in some transition economies, lasted for shorter periods but imposed severe costs on output and on the population.&lt;br /&gt;
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These episodes share common features. Large fiscal deficits, financed by money creation, were present in each case, often as a consequence of war, revolution, or the collapse of the tax system. The loss of confidence in the currency, the flight into foreign money and goods, and the accelerating rate of price increase appeared repeatedly. The endings also had common elements, including decisive fiscal adjustment and credible institutional reform.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Lessons for policy ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The lessons of hyperinflation for policy are clear. Fiscal discipline is essential, because monetary expansion that finances deficits is the fundamental cause. Institutional arrangements that constrain monetary financing, such as central bank independence, rules limiting credit to the government, or a currency board, provide credibility and help to anchor expectations. Communication and transparency support confidence, and external support can ease the transition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The lessons also extend to moderate inflation. Persistent deficits and reliance on seigniorage can initiate a process that, if unchecked, may accelerate, and the early signs of monetisation deserve attention. The cost of ending inflation rises with its level and duration, because expectations become entrenched and institutions are weakened. Prompt corrective action, before inflation becomes entrenched, is therefore preferable to a belated response.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Consequences for institutions and society ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Hyperinflation damages institutions and society. It erodes trust in the state and in the currency, and it redistributes income and wealth in arbitrary ways, harming savers, pensioners, and wage earners. It may encourage informal activity, dollarisation, and capital flight, all of which reduce the tax base and weaken the effectiveness of policy. Rebuilding confidence and institutions after such an episode takes time and sustained effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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The human costs are also significant. Uncertainty about prices complicates daily life, and the need to convert income into goods quickly imposes transaction costs on households and firms. The erosion of real incomes can push households into poverty, and the disruption of production and trade reduces employment. For these reasons, preventing hyperinflation, through prudent fiscal and monetary policies and through strong institutions, is far less costly than ending it once it begins.&lt;br /&gt;
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== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
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* [[Inflation]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Seigniorage]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Currency Reform]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Deficit Spending]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Monetary Policy]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Journal literature on the economics of hyperinflation.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;International Monetary Fund studies of stabilisation programmes.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Central bank research on money, inflation, and credibility.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;r4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Economic history studies of historical hyperinflations.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Heioo</name></author>
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